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The overarching goal of How Propaganda Works is to provide an argument that democracy 
requires material equality. My aim was to forge an argument for this view without premises 
about morality or justice. I do so by arguing that material inequality, like other forms of in-
equality, has pernicious epistemic effects. Inequality results in anti-democratic flawed ideolo-
gies, such as the ideology of meritocracy, and the ideology underlying the division of labor, 
the subjects of the last two chapters. Propaganda plays crucial roles both in preventing us 
from recognizing these epistemic harms, in the form of demagoguery, and in repairing them, 
in the form of civic rhetoric.
The first half of the book is about propaganda. Chapter 2 advances a novel analysis of 
propaganda, as well as a novel explanation of its effectiveness. I split propaganda into two 
varieties. The first more familiar kind, which I call “supporting propaganda”, employs a 
valued political ideal to elicit emotion devoid of reason (such as ungrounded fear, or un-
grounded pride) in the service of realizing that ideal. It is another species of propaganda 
that is however the focus of the book, which I call undermining propaganda. Undermining 
propaganda is an argument that employs an ideal in the service of a goal that tends to un-
dermine that ideal. Undermining propaganda is demagoguery when there is a flawed ideol-
ogy in place that distorts a valuable political ideal in such a way that prevents recognition of 
the fact that the goal undermines the realization of the valued ideal.
Here are some basic examples that exemplify how flawed ideologies make undermin-
ing propaganda effective. Both involve the ideal of freedom, and the flawed ideology of 
anti-Black racism. Southerners in the United States during secession and the Civil War 
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appealed to the ideal of freedom to defend their secession. A flawed racist ideology was re-
quired to mask the contradictions inherent in appealing to freedom in order to defend a 
social order based on the enslavement of so many. On a similar note, Frederick Douglass’s 
1892 speech, “The Meaning of Fourth of July for the Negro” calls attention to the way rac-
ist ideology masked the paradox of celebrating freedom on the Fourth of July under condi-
tions of widespread enslavement.
One might wonder, however, given my explanation of why propaganda is effective, 
whether propaganda is at all important. If the presence of flawed ideology explains the ef-
fectiveness of propaganda, doesn’t the fault lie just in the flawed ideology? This response 
neglects the crucially important role propaganda plays in masking flawed ideologies. In each 
society, there are ideals that are sacred. It is difficult to argue for policies that explicitly vio-
late the sacred ideal. A violation of a sacred ideal must therefore often be packaged in the 
language of that ideal. The flawed ideology is what prevents you from recognizing that the 
policy proposal being advanced is in fact a violation of the very ideal that it is presented as 
furthering. One example is policies that restrict certain religious practices in the name of 
protecting liberal freedoms, such as gay rights. In the propaganda of climate change, we 
find oil companies and large agribusiness setting up their own “science” institutes, present-
ing anti-science policies under the guise of science. The “Discovery Institute” in the United 
States defends intelligent design against evolution, under the guise of scientific inquiry. In 
each case, the propagandistic guise is important to mask the flawed ideology. Undermining 
propaganda is the central concept of How Propaganda Works, because undermining propa-
ganda is how we conceal from ourselves the immense gaps between liberal democratic ide-
als and illiberal reality.
When we think of political propaganda, we think for example (in the United States 
at least) of the strategy of using certain vocabulary, sometimes called “dog whistles”, e.g. 
“welfare”, and “inner city”, which in the United States trigger negative racial messages, 
to signal adherence to problematic yet popular anti-democratic ideologies. We also 
think of the propaganda that accompanies social movements, emphasizing the solidar-
ity between citizens otherwise divided by prejudice, as in the Civil Rights Movement. 
How do these characteristic examples of propaganda fit into my analysis of undermin-
ing propaganda?
I argue that these are cases in which the all important liberal democratic ideal of rea-
sonableness is central. In a liberal democracy, we are supposed to consider every citizen’s 
perspective in arguing for policy. Chapter 3 is a lengthy discussion of the notion of reason-
ableness, which is meant to undergird the discussion of civic rhetoric, as well as the subse-
quent discussion of code words in Chapter 4. As I there explain, the basis of reasonableness 
is empathy. Chapter 3 contains my discussion of civic rhetoric. The goal of civic rhetoric is 
to undermine flawed ideologies that diminish empathy. The goal of demagoguery, by con-
trast, is to erode empathy. Chapter 4 is a detailed description of the mechanism underlying 
one species of demagoguery, which exploits reasonableness against itself. For example, dis-
cussing economic policy by using words like “welfare” seems like classic reasonable politi-
cal discourse. But via the mechanisms I describe in Chapter 4, such terms can be associated 
with unreasonable beliefs, such as that Black Americans are lazy.
In W.E.B Du Bois’s classic 1926 paper, “Criteria of Negro Art”, he formulates a strat-
egy for those without power to make their perspectives visible to a dominant majority. Du 
Bois argues that the only Black artists white Americans want to see are those who fit cer-
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tain subordinating racial stereotypes; they “want Uncle Toms, Topsies, good “darkies” and 
clowns.” His strategy is to employ art that uses the subordinating racial norms as a mask, 
ultimately to undermine them by revealing a Black humanity inconsistent with these sub-
ordinating and dehumanizing stereotypes. Alain Locke names this strategy, the use of “art 
as propaganda”. Art is Du Bois’s suggested tool for expanding empathy and realizing Amer-
ican democracy by making public spaces more reasonable, to make public discourse about 
policy inclusive of all perspectives.
Du Bois’s paper was written during the flourishing of the Harlem Renaissance. James 
Weldon Johnson, the head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) in the 1920s, and a central member of the Harlem Renaissance move-
ment, shared Du Bois’s political vision of art as a vehicle for liberation. In turn, Du Bois re-
garded the NAACP as an ideal vehicle to plan such propaganda “And it is right here that 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People comes upon the field, 
comes with its great call to a new battle, a new fight and new things to fight before the old 
things are wholly won; and to say that the beauty of truth and freedom which shall some 
day be our heritage and the heritage of all civilized men is not in our hands yet and that we 
ourselves must not fail to realize.”
The popular 1921 Broadway play Shuffle Along is a classic example of the use of Du 
Bois’s strategy. The writers met at an NAACP benefit, and the play was written by Black 
authors, produced by Black citizens, and starred Black performers. Marketed, as is evi-
dent from its title, to appeal to whites with a simplistic stereotyped vision of Black ex-
istence, it used novel forms of jazz to call attention to the vastly greater complexity and 
humanity of Black American life. It is civic rhetoric in the form of undermining propa-
ganda.
Civic rhetoric also of course takes the form of supporting propaganda. Here, it to re-
alize the ideals of liberty and equality, by appealing to audience’s emotional connection 
to these ideals. Here, I use the work of Melvin Rogers to illuminate the ways in which Du 
Bois and others employed civic rhetoric in this way, as a direct attempt to increase the reali-
zation of democratic ideals.
Civic rhetoric attempts to expand empathy and realize the ideal of reasonableness. In 
contrast, demagogic propaganda in a liberal democracy masks violations of reasonableness, 
by making certain perspectives invisible. Chapter 4 is an investigation of one way in which 
demagogic propaganda can occur, unnoticed, in a liberal democracy.
Though Chapter 4 is extensive, its scope is limited. In it, I work out in detail how one 
class of political propaganda fits into my framework. Chapter 4 is not in any sense meant 
to be a general account of undermining propaganda. It just so happens that the tools of lin-
guistics allow us to give a detailed account of one characteristic mechanism by which rea-
sonableness is used to undermine reasonableness (often called “code words”). In this chap-
ter, I show how repeated association between words and messages can create a second level 
of communicated content, which can be made precise in with distinctions drawn in recent 
semantics and pragmatics. On one level of content, the “official” level, a discourse can seem 
reasonable. Yet because of the additional, second level of communicated content, the com-
municative act can be unreasonable.
In Chapter 4, I give a detailed account of a mechanism of propaganda. But most of the 
examples of effective undermining propaganda I discuss in the book do not exploit the se-
mantic and pragmatic apparatus discussed in Chapter 4. For example, none of the seven ex-
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amples of undermining propaganda discussed at the end of Chapter 2 require invocation of 
the semantic and pragmatic apparatus of Chapter 4. The topic of “code words” allows for 
systematic detailed investigation in ways that other examples either do not allow, or do not 
require.
The rest of How Propaganda Works is about the topic of ideology. Kristie Dotson 
(2014) characterizes epistemic oppression as:
…persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production. Epis-
temic exclusion, here, will be understood as an unwarranted infringement on the epistemic agency 
of knowers.
 
Epistemic agency, in this analysis, refers to the ability to utilize persuasively shared 
epistemic resources within a given community of knowers in order to participate in knowledge 
production and, if required, the revision of those same resources.1
How Propaganda Works situates the topic of epistemic oppression in the long history of 
democratic political philosophy. I argue that inequality results in characteristic kinds of 
flawed ideologies, and possession of these flawed ideologies result in various kinds of epis-
temic oppression. The book situates epistemic oppression in the context of democratic po-
litical philosophy in the structure familiar from leading political philosophers of previous 
eras, such as W.E.B. Du Bois and John Dewey, where philosophy of education was at its 
center. A democracy requires a public culture with social conditions that enable democracy. 
The topic of how to bring out these social conditions, for example by a civic education, re-
ceived much more attention in previous eras.
Chapter 5 is a general overview of my favored account of flawed ideology. Chapters 
6 and 7 are devoted to two flawed ideologies that emerge in conditions of inequality, in 
the process of justifying the inequalities. The subject matter of Chapter 6 is the ideology 
of meritocracy. The subject matter of Chapter 7 is the ideology of a natural distinction 
between practical and theoretical pursuits. I place these ideologies in their lengthy his-
torical context in democratic political philosophy, and argue that they are almost invaria-
bly democratically problematic. These ideologies are frequent sources of ignorance about 
important facets of social and political reality. I also explain the ideological function of 
these epistemically problematic features, that is, their role in justifying hierarchical social 
orders.
In Chapter 5, I use Dan Kahan’s account of identity protective cognition to give an ac-
count of ideology that is normatively neutral, as in Sally Haslanger’s work.2 I then charac-
terize the notion of a flawed ideology. Since I intend my arguments not to rely on moral or 
political premises, the notion of flaw in question is epistemic. A flawed ideology of a do-
main is one that prevents the acquisition of important knowledge about that domain. I 
explain how the epistemically problematic features of flawed ideologies function ideologi-
cally, in preventing the acquisition of knowledge, by implementing various forms of epis-
temic injustice and oppression.
A central example in the book, and developed in chapter 5, is the flawed ideology of 
technicism. Technicism restricts reasons to those that can be given in a specific form, those 
1 Kristie Dotson (2014), “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression”, Social Epistemology: A Journal of 
Knowledge, Culture and Policy.
2 See Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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given in the language of technical expertise. Chapter 2, the central chapter of the book, be-
gins with Samuel Huntington’s trilateral commission report on the crisis of democracy, 
which calls for the use of “experts” to make citizens feel like they do not have the capacity 
to participate democratically in institutional accountability.3 Technicism is a flawed ideol-
ogy, because it seals those subject to it off from important sources of testimony about social 
and political reality.
Chapter 6 is about the ideology of meritocracy. The chapter is devoted to arguing 
that in conditions of inequality, a robust ideology will emerge among those who are at 
the top of the hierarchy that their status is deserved. I use social psychology to help ex-
plain why the ideology emerges. I use work in analytic epistemology to explain why the 
ideology is robust even in the face of clear counter-evidence. Here, I draw on work of my 
own and others on the “interest-relativity” of knowledge, which entails that having more 
at stake raises epistemic barriers that suggests the existence of genuine epistemic barri-
ers in policy deliberation for those worst off. Such barriers, as standpoint epistemologists 
have long argued, are countered by the epistemic privilege of oppressed social position. 
But flawed ideology prevents elites from recognizing epistemic privilege of this kind. I 
conclude by arguing that elites who benefit from inegalitarian social structures suffer 
more extreme epistemic harm than those oppressed by them. Elites have moral interests 
at stake. These moral interests raise epistemic barriers to elite’s knowledge even more 
pressing than the ones facing the disadvantaged. The ideology robs the elite of agency in 
decision making. Material inequality poisons the epistemic space required for democrati-
cally legitimate policy formation, by a general and pervasive occlusion of social and polit-
ical reality.
Even if one retains knowledge, being treated as if one lacks knowledge is an epistemic 
harm. Rae Langton defines silencing as “[stopping] speech from counting as an action.”4 
What she here means is that although denials are made, they are counted as having been 
made. She unquestionably takes this to be a kind of epistemic oppression or injustice. Simi-
larly, if one knows, but is treated by dominant groups as not knowing, that is epistemic op-
pression. It is true that I have an argument that connects power to knowledge. Knowledge 
is sufficient for action, and sometimes power prevents action. But nothing in my overall ar-
gument in the book depends on taking this extra step.
Though I do not need to be for the purposes of my book, I am unfashionably drawn 
to the view that dominant ideology must be taken seriously as a potential causal factor on 
mass opinion. Never very popular, the notion of false consciousness has fallen upon par-
ticularly hard times. The doctrine of false consciousness prima facie presupposes some-
thing like Rousseau’s General Will. The consciousness is false because it is not true to the 
real desires of the agents who have it. But who determines the real desires?5 Or perhaps the 
consciousness is false because it justifies a picture of the world that does not correspond 
to reality. But who is the arbiter of reality? These problems and other difficulties for false 
3 Patricia Hill Collins describes the ideology of technicism as the conceptual scheme of “Eurocentric 
Knowledge Validation Processes”.
4 Rae Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1993): 293-330.
5 In “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität”, his Rektoratsrede, Martin Heidegger decries the 
“Academic freedom” of German Universities, as mere negative freedom. True freedom, he argues is in 
“den geistigen Auftrag des deutschen Volkes”.
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consciousness theses have been a persisting theme of democratic political philosophy from 
Benjamin Constant, through Isaiah Berlin, to today.6
In addition to problems of misuse, there are also worries about its faithfulness to reality 
and objectification of oppressed groups. Michael Rosen (1996, pp. 181-3) ridicules “the in-
terests model” of ideological false consciousness, that treats “those who live under the dom-
ination of the ruling class as passive victims, taking their lives from those who control ‘the 
means of production’ like obedient chicks, with no critical reflection on their part are true 
or in their own rational interests.”7 James C. Scott argues that it is quite evident that the 
dominated class is not imaginatively restricted about alternative and better world possibili-
ties, they are not deprived of epistemic resources in the way that dominant ideology theory 
predicts.8 There are also many distinct reasons to worry about coherence. For example, Se-
rene Khader has brought out powerfully certain incoherence worries about the false con-
sciousness thesis of adaptive preferences.9
Does this mean we cannot make sense of the thought that an oppressed group accepts 
an ideology that runs counter to their interests? The case of the ideology of meritocracy is a 
promising example of dominant ideology theory at work. Surely there are some people who 
grew up in structural conditions that disadvantaged them in a way that clearly is inconsist-
ent with a meritocratic society, who nevertheless believe that society is meritocratic. Two 
other examples I provide are British Imperialism in East Africa (pp. 235-6), and the 2003 
Iraq War.
Each of these examples of the imposition of dominant group ideology can be contest-
ed.10 But even the harshest critics of false consciousness admit that “public action will pro-
vide a constant stream of evidence that appears to support an interpretation of ideological 
hegemony.”11 I agree with critics that appearances are often deceptive. But I also think that 
 6 Benjamin Constant (1819), “The Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the Moderns”, speech 
given at the Athénée Royal, decries the mistaking of “the authority of the social body for liberty” (in 
Constant: Political Writing, edited by Biancamaria Fontana, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1988: 307-328, at 318), and of course famously in the 20th century the point that positive freedom is 
too frequently propagandistically exploited is made by Isaiah Berlin, in “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in 
The Proper Study of Mankind (1997) (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux).
 7 The interests model is just one of five different models of ideology that Rosen (1996, chapter 6) 
sources in Marx’s writings. All of them are false consciousness theses, but they explain the false con-
sciousness in different and often incompatible ways. The version of ideology he takes most serious 
treats it as a form of functional explanation (“the correspondence model”).
 8 See James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), 
Chapter 4, “False Consciousness or Laying it on Thick?”.
 9 Serene Khader, chapter 2 of Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment (Oxford University 
Press, 2011).
10 Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., in her essay in this volume, rightly critiques my book for depending on an analysis 
that ignores intersectionality. She also has sketched an alternative account of the Iraq War case, that 
does not depend upon appeal to anything like the acceptance of dominant group ideology. Perhaps the 
fact that so many Americans were convinced by government propaganda in 2003 can be explained by 
the fact that even poor Americans have intersectional identities that make them dominant over poor 
Iraqis. That’s a brilliant avenue of explanation that did not occur to me when writing the book. I am 
not sure however that it is descriptively adequate; more discussion is required.
11 James C. Scott (1990, p. 70).
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history shows us that there are specific times and places at which the problem of mass opin-
ion becomes pressing to political theorists, its existence hard to deny.
One such period was the time between World War I and World War II. It is during 
this time that Walter Lippmann, Carl Schmitt, John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and oth-
ers who have deeply affected the narrative of How Propaganda Works engaged with the 
problem. As Walter Lippmann and especially Carl Schmitt noted, elites manipulate mass 
opinion during war time. Moments of mass extermination, of the sort that occurred un-
der H itler and Stalin, certainly also call for reflection on mass opinion formation. And the 
present moment in Europe and the west, where far right nationalist politicians are garner-
ing ever more support, may turn out to be another. John Dewey thought it was so impor-
tant for citizens to reflect on the problem of the crafting of mass opinion by elites that his 
influence on the social studies curriculum in the United States was a final 12th grade year 
on the subject. The standard textbook for 12th grade social studies became Harold Rugg’s 
An Introduction to Problems of American Culture, a book that calls upon students to reflect 
upon the reality of elite formation of mass opinion.
That said, the central moral of chapter 6 is independent of any commitment to domi-
nant ideology theory. The Chapter is about the ideology of meritocracy. It is clear that in 
societies in which this ideology is robustly held, it is a problem because of its robustness and 
preponderance in the dominant class. If there is a social injustice that threatens meritoc-
racy, the elite will not notice it. If the ideal of meritocracy is distant enough from reality, 
it will rob the elite of agency in democratic deliberation. The central moral of Chapter 6 is 
about the negative epistemic effects of material inequality on the elite.
Chapter 7 is about the ideology that underlies the division of labor, the separation of 
humans into those who labor and those who lead. The ideology I consider is the view that 
there is a distinction of natural capacities that underlies the division of tasks and occupa-
tions into the practical and the theoretical. There is a division between manual labor, craft, 
and theoretical reflection, but as Antonio Gramsci urges in the case of the concept of an in-
tellectual, it is only social and political in nature. There is no distinction of natural capaci-
ties that underlie dividing tasks into menial, practical, and theoretical. This ideology is an 
attempt to give a naturalistic justification of the assignment of large groups of people to 
menial labor, or vocational education, while keeping liberal education just for an elite few.
Drawing on arguments I have developed in books and papers about the nature of 
knowledge how and skill, I argue that there is a no naturalistic basis for a division between 
even manual labor and intellectual reflection. Rather than justifying the ideology, the work 
in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience rather reflects it.
I link the work I have done on knowing how and skill to Gramsci’s notion of “organic 
intellectuals”, arguing that it vindicates Gramsci’s view that intelligent decision making and 
knowledge are present even in the most menial industrial tasks. If the account of knowledge 
how I defend is right, even the most menial manual practices, such as factory work, exempli-
fies agency, free intelligent choice. The consequences of this are far-reaching. It is not that some 
people in society are gifted in theoretical reflection, others in craft, while the remainder must 
be consigned to ditch digging and menial industrial work. Each skill is a combination of ele-
ments that are operative in other domains as well. These conclusions undermine the sorting 
of humans into labor pools, as well as its putative educational basis, the distinction between in-
dustrial or vocational education, on the one hand, and liberal education, on the other.
In the first twenty years of the 20th century in the United States, there was another kind 
of systematic attempt to give a scientific basis to the division of labor. It was called the “so-
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cial efficiency” movement. On the face of it, the movement was a search for a social scientific 
basis to the separation of students into those who would receive vocational education, from 
those who would receive a liberal education. Advocates of social efficiency used quantitative 
research to justify grouping individuals into life outcomes from an early stage. I argue that 
the social efficiency movement was in fact quite explicitly grounded on a desire to impose 
social control. Rather than serving as an independent scientific basis for sorting society into 
hierarchical levels, it was explicitly an attempt to justify hierarchical divisions of worth be-
tween citizens, with a pseudo-scientific overlay in place for propaganda purposes.
Chapter 7, like the chapters before it, is structured by the analysis of numerous impor-
tant examples of undermining propaganda. One example is the debate during the forma-
tion of the United States public school curriculum in the early part of the 20th century about 
whether to teach History or Social Studies in public schools. This debate is sometimes called 
in the literature, “The Social Studies Wars” (also the title of a book on the topic). Should 
one teach history, with all its particularities? Or should one instead devote that time to con-
structing a narrative that departs from history, but has a useful societal function? It was de-
cided to teach Social Studies instead of history, featuring a uniform narrative of American 
identity that would be useful in, for example, assimilating new waves of immigrants.
John Dewey argued for the need for a class in civic education, to engage students in 
what he regarded as the fundamental task of a democratic citizen, the mutual construction 
of a shared civic identity. Thinking social studies would be this class, Dewey weighed in on 
the side of social studies. But Dewey did not recognize that what he regarded as a bottom 
up exercise in the construction of an American identity, the social studies curriculum, was 
largely instead a top down effort to impose such an identity on students for the purposes 
of social control.12 We see, in the history of the United States public school system, a para-
digm example of the propagandistic misuse of the ideals of positive freedom.
In the discussion of the basis for the 20th century US public school system, we also see 
the characteristic kind of undermining propaganda that occurs with social science research, 
what Alasdair MacIntyre has called “manipulative expertise”. The ideals of science were 
employed propagandistically to justify pre-existing unjust hierarchies. For example, advo-
cates of social efficiency argued that liberal education was wasted on women, as the statis-
tics showed most women who acquired a higher education nevertheless did not enter the 
workforce. But that is no justification at all for the frighteningly patriarchal society of the 
time, where female educational achievements did not afford them anywhere near the same 
opportunities as similar achievements by men.
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